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Notes
OPINION TESTIMONY AND ULTIMATE
ISSUES: INCOMPATIBLE?
The general rule in this country controlling the admission of
testimonial evidence is that a witness must confine his testimony to
facts which are within his personal knowledge.' The requirement of
personal knowledge is based upon a rule of the common law.2 The
additional requirement that a witness must testify to facts, and avoid
opinions, stems from the manner in which the Amencan courts have
interpreted this common law rule. At common law, the English courts
were denouncing testimony which was not based on personal knowledge
when they condemned opinion testimony.3 Apparently, our courts
misinterpreted this criticism as meaning that a witness should not be
allowed to draw an inference or make a conclusion even if he did
have personal knowledge of the facts.4 The present Amencan view on
this point, therefore, is more stnct than that of the early common law.
In theory this general rule is sound. Since the witness is limited to
relating personally observed facts, the function of forming opinions
and drawing inferences rests exclusively with the jury. As a practical
matter, however, courts have recognized the need of allowing opinions by
lay and expert witnesses in certain situations. Generally, the lay witness
"may be permitted to state his opinion, inference, or conclusion from
observed facts where his mental impressions or observations cannot be
adequately conveyed to the jury otherwise."' i The expert's opinion is
"admissible where the subject matter is such that a jury cannot be ex-
pected to draw correct inferences from the facts." 6 In these situations,
however, the opinions of these witnesses will not be admitted into
evidence as a matter of right. Additional requirements may have to be
satisfied. In one junsdiction for example, the court pointed out that
I McConmck, Evidence §§10, 11 (1954) [Hereinafter cited as McCormick];
5 Richardson, Kentucky Practice §2229 (1957).
2 McCormuck §10.
8See McCormick, p. 21 nn.6 & 7.
4 See McCormick §11; 7 Wigmore, Evidence §1917 (3d ed. 1940).
55 Richardson, op. cit. supra note 1. Tis represents the view taken by the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States, including Kentucky. See generally
McCormick ch. 3.
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an opinion by a lay witness must be "necessary to the due administra-
tion of justice."
7
The question of admissability also arises when an opinion of either a
lay or an expert witness touches on an ultimate issue. This note defines
the phrase ultimate issue, explains the basic problems confronting the
courts with respect to opinion testimony on these issues, outlines the
existing legal doctrines in this field of law, summarizes the present
trend and advances a recommendation. Lay and expert opinions are
discussed conjointly.
Ultimate Issues Defined
An ultimate issue is "either such an issue as within itself is sufficient
and final for the disposition of the entire case or one which in con-
nection with other issues will serve such end."" Thus, it is a question
which is essential to the plaintiff's right of action or the defendant's
ground of defense.
Some courts refer to opinion testimony on an ultimate fact, 9 rather
than on an ultimate issue. Sometimes the two phrases are used inter-
changeably.10 They have even been combined, e.g., the ultimate fact
issue.' Technically, it makes no difference whether it is an ultimate
issue or an ultimate fact on which the court allows or disallows a
witness to testify, since the submission of an issue to the jury neces-
sarily requires their finding of a fact or a group of facts. In one instance
the court is considering the question the jury will be asked and in the
other it is noting the answer the jury will be called upon to find.
Ultimate issues, then, are counterparts of ultimate facts. But what
makes an ultimate fact "ultimate"' How is it distinguishable from
other facts? The law generally recognizes two types of facts-evidentiary
and ultimate. Evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts introduced
to prove ultimate facts.' 2 Ultimate facts are the logical conclusions
deduced from these evidentiary facts; the latter form the permises and
the former become the conclusions. A conclusion of law has been
7 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Schultz, 43 Oluo 270, 1 N.E. 824, 332 (1885).
Professor McCormick agrees that an opinion of a law witness should not
be admissible as a matter of nght, but he objects to the requirement of necessity.
He proposes that courts should sanction the admission of lay opinions on grounds
of 'expediency or convenience." McCormick, p. 23.
8 Black, Law Dictionairy 965 (4th ed. 1951).
9 See, e.g., Dreeben v. Sidor, 254 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
10 Ibid.
1" Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Edwards, 82 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930).
12 Texas Employers Ins. Ass n v. Reed, 150 $.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Cir. App.
1941).
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recognized in at least one junsdiction as a third type of fact. 3
Conclusions of law are those legal deductions which, the facts being
given, are drawn without further evidence. The interplay and distinc-
tions among these three types of facts are explained in the following
example:
The result reached by a presumption of law may be a fact equally
with that attained by a deduction of the same fact from the existence
of other and evidentiary facts. It is the process by which the result
is attained which is or may be different, and the tribunal through
which such result is reached that differs, rather than the result itself.
An act, deed, circumstance, or event is none the less a fact because
reached as a conclusion of law.
Suppose A. sues B. for services performed. The latter pleads pay-
ment. Here payment becomes the ultimate fact to be established.
B. proves that he employed a large number of men, and was accustomed
to make weekly payments; that A. was observed among others at the
time and place where payment was made; that a considerable period
has elapsed since A. left the employ of B., during which time the
former made no claim: these are circumstances from which, as
evidentiary facts, a jury may presume the ultimate fact of payment;
but the presumption is one of fact, and not of law. Again, suppose the
same case, but that the time prescribed by the statute of limitations in
bar of the action has run. The law steps in, and presumes payment.
The result reached may be the same, but it is reached by a different
process.14
In this example the lines separating these different types of facts seem
to be clear and distinct. In most actual cases, however, the distinctions
may be scarcely appreciable. In these instances, only a proper analysis
of the legal controversy can determine what constitutes an ultimate fact.
Furthermore, the litigation of a single cause often will require the jury
to find more than one ultimate fact. In an action for damages for
injunes sustained by the defendant's negligence, for example, the com-
plete ultimate issuc, for which ultimate facts must be found, is made
up of four subsidiary issues, i.e., the fact alleged, whether the same be
negligence, whether such negligence be the proximate cause of the
injury and the amount of the damages.'I
The Basic Problems
A judge may have to make two determinations when an objection
is raised that certain testimony is inadmissible because it is merely the
witness opinion. He must first decide whether the testimony is actually
an opinion or a fact. If an opinion, then he must decide whether it
13 Levms v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 Pac, 161, 162 (1886).
14 Id., 12 Pac. at 163.
15This appeared as dictum in North v. Atlas Brick Co., 76 Tex. 210,
13 S.W.2d 59, 61 (1929).
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should be admissible as an exception to the general rule. A proper
disposition of the first problem may appear to be elementary, but those
who have sought an answer have not been able to find any distinct
line separating opinions and facts. McCormick writes that "the terms
'fact' and 'opinion' denote merely a difference of degree of concreteness
of descriptions "16 Two other writers take the position that every
statement may be said to be a statement of fact when compared with
a more general statement on the same subject. 17 By way of explanation
they say"
[I~n comparison with the statement "X was not mentally competent
to execute a will" the statement "X was insane" is a statement of
fact. In comparison with the statement "X was insane" the statement
"X acted peculiarly" is a statement of fact. In companson with the
statement "X acted peculiarly" the statement "X had a vacant stare"
is a statement of fact.' 8
Yet in each instance the judge must separate facts from opinions. No
case has been found in which the judge failed to decide the nature of
the testimony. The final decision on this question is left to his dis-
cretion.
The second problem will anse only if the testimony is denominated
opinion. If so, what requirements must be satisfied before the general
rule bows to the exception? Suppose that in the judge's belief this
opinion is necessary to the due administration of justice. Will the
testimony then be admissible? Maybe so, maybe not. Much depends
on whether the opinion is on an ultimate issue.
As a practical matter, if the opinion is on some remotely relevant
fact there probably will be no objection. But as the opinion becomes
more revelant, naturally there will be more attempts to prevent the
admission of this testimony. Generally speaking, the more relevant the
testimony, the more courts will tend to require the witnesses to testify
to details and refrain from inferences. 19
But what view will be taken if the testimonial opinion is directly
on an ultimate issue? Basically, there are two considerations. Since
it is the function of the jury to answer ultimate issues by finding the
ultimate facts, an opinion on these issues or facts would invade their
province. On the other hand, if the testimony is refused admission the
jury would not have been fully informed on all relevant issues.
Much judicial wrangling has ansen concerming whether opinion
testimony on an ultimate issue is admissible. With respect to expert
26 McCormick, p. 24.
I nd Piln er Opinion Evidence n Ilinois 
10 (1942).
'9 McCormick, pp. 24-25,
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opinions of this type, one judge has written that "it would be difficult
to find a subject in law in which there has been more judicial con-
fusion and quibbling. "20 The cases holding this testimony to be
inadmissible usually state that it usurps the function2 1 or invades the
province 22 of the jury and summarily dismiss the matter. The pro-
ponents of its admissibility contend, on the other hand, that it makes
no difference if an opinion happens to be on an ultimate issue because
the more relevant the testimony, the more it will assist the jury in
making a proper disposition of the case.2 3 Wigmore further asserts that
it is a "mere bit of empty rethonc" to say an opinion on an ultimate
fact or issue will usurp the jury's function because a witness could not
do this even if he desired.
2 4
Existing Legal Doctrines
The judicial views on the question of whether a witness' opinion
on an ultimate issue is admissible can be grouped into four categones.
The most conservative view is that a witness cannot state an opinion
if it is on an ultimate issue.2 5 Although these courts purportedly refuse
to admit opinions that bear on ultimate issues, these same courts allow
this testimony on issues of sanity,26 handwriting2 7 and causation 28 in
cases where these are clearly ultimate issues. Either these courts
improperly perceive the characteristics of an ultimate matter in all
situations or the anomaly is explicable.
Deviating slightly from the aforementioned, the second view refuses
to allow opinion testimony on ultimate issues unless it is deemed neces-
sary in the judge s discretion.Y9 Frequently, the same result will be reached
regardless of which view is followed. This is because opinion testimony
on such ultimate issues as sanity, handwriting and causation often is
deemed necessary by courts following this second view. A comparison
of two cases serves to point out this similarity In a case following this
secondcmentioned view, the court allowed an expert to voice an
opinion on the issue of causation by saying, "if special or expert
2 0 Gnsmore v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655
(1942).
2i Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Springfield & N.W R.R., 67 I1. 142, 145 (1873).
2 2 DeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247 N.W 69, 71 (1933).
23 1 Greenleaf 551 (16th ed. 1899); McCormick, p. 26; 7 Wigmore, Evidence
§1921 (3d ed. 1940).
24 7 Wigmore, Evidence 17 (3d ed. 1940).2
5 E.g., Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 251 Ala. 148, 36 So. 2d 343 (1948);
State v. Carr, 196 N.C. 129, 144 S.E. 698 (1928).26 E.g., State v. Alexander, 179 N.C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920).2
7 E.g., Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, 111 S.E. 517 (1922).2 8 E.g., Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Farmer 251 Ala. 148, 36 So. 2d 343 (1948).
29 National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W.2d 92
(1935).
[Vol. 51,
No-ms
knowledge is necessary for the proper determination of the cause of a
condition, we see no reason why such evidence should not be admitted
"SO In a case adhenng to the first-mentioned view, the court
allowed an expert to give his opinion on causation by simply stating
that "since he was an expert, there was nothing in his testimony
which invaded the province of the jury."
8'
A third view allows opinion testimony on ultimate issues but
restricts its form by requinng that it clearly sound like an opinion
and not assume the qualities of a conclusion. Kentucky is a jurisdiction
that follows this rule. 2 In a recent decision ss the Kentucky court had
to rule on the question of whether it was proper for an electrcian, who
qualified as an expert, to testify that the cause of a fire was a short
circuit in a meter. The court answered by stating:
Clearly the trial court was correct in excluding this "opinion
testimony" as it was the very question the jury would have been
called upon to decide had the case reached it. It would have been
competent to ask the witness if in his opinion the defect he found
30 National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W.2d 92, 96
(1935).
31 Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 251 Ala. 148, 36 So. 2d 348, 346 (1948).
32 The following synthesis of cases outlines the development of this rule in
Kentucky. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609, 131 S.W 523 (1910),
an expert witness was asked to give his opinion of what produced auto-intoxication
in the victim. It had previously been established that this caused the death. He
gave his answer as to what in Its judgment was the cause. The court stated that
the question and answer were objectionable because the witness was asked to
give a conclusion, and his answer was couched in that form.
Later, in Taylor Coal Co. v. Miller, 168 Ky. 719, 182 S.W 920 (1916) and
Madison Coal Co. v. Altimire, 215 Ky. 288, 284 S.W 1068 (1926), the court
followed the Bethel case in not allowing conclusions on ultimate issues. However,
in Crampton v. Dane, 224 Ky. 507, 6 S.W.2d 686 (1928) and Manrns Ex r v.
Leyman Motor Co., 234 Ky. 639, 28 S.W.2d 956 (1930), expert opinions, which
clearly sounded as such, were allowed in evidence.
The Kentucky appellate court was again presented with the question of
whether to allow a witness to give an opinion in the form of a conclusion on an
ultimate issue in Gibson v. Crawford, 259 Ky. 708. 83 S.W.2d 1 (1935). Rather
than following the strict letter of the rule in the Bethel case the court equivocated
by saying that it "had rather these questions had been in better form, but is not
the opimon of an expert after all Ins conclusion from the facts stated to hiu?"
Gibson v. Crawford, supra at 721, 83 S.W.2d at 7. The court satisfied itself that
the testimony should be admissible by saying that the error, if any, was not
prejudicial.
The language used in the Gibson case seemed to recognize similarity between
testimonial opinions and -conclusions and the futility in attempting to distinguish
them. The court seemed to be breaking away from the rule set forth in the
Bethel case.
But the next time the court was faced with this question, the rule of the
Bethel case was followed. Jn Darlington v. Owens County Rural Elec. Co-op.
Corp., 299 S.W.2d 599 (Ky..1956). the court cited the Bethel case, ignored the
language of the Gibson case and held that it was correct to sustain an objection to
a question which asked a witness to give an opinion in the form of a conclusion
on an ultimate issue. The Darlington holding is current law.
S Darlington v. Owen County Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp., 299 S.W.2d 599
(Ky. 1956).
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in the meter could have caused the fire, but not that it did cause the
fire. (Emphasis added.)3 4
Obviously, the courts following this view take a compromising posi-
tion.35 They allow a slight encroachment on the jury's function, but
attempt to preserve that function in part by restncting the form of the
testimony. This position has been adversly criticized because it deprives
the jury of knowing how definite the witness feels about his position."
The fourth and most liberal view is that a witness may give an
opinion on an ultimate issue in any form depending upon his degree
of certainty. This view is represented by a recent Illinois decision in
which the court overruled a line of cases by stating, "the form of the
answer, when in terms of 'what did' or 'what might' have caused the
injury and death, is immatenal." (Emphasis added.)37 If this posi-
tion is adopted, there is the inherent possibility that the jury will place
too-much emphasis on a conclusion, and the witness, in effect, will be
deciding the final outcome of the litigation. Nevertheless, it seems
better to allow this possibility than to leave the jurors floundering in
uncertainty as to the degree of the witness' positiveness. This encroach-
ment on the office of the jury has been termed "reasonable."38
The Present Trend
Frequently, new trends in a particular field of law are difficult, if not
impossible, to determine. This can be attributed to several factors, one
being that most courts are reluctant to change policies swiftly, if ever,
even if other policies are conceived which are clearly more desirable.
This reluctance has been criticized as being one of the greatest
obstacles in the path of justice.39 In his criticism, one writer compares
the legal and medical professions by saying:
If a new [disease] preventive is discovered in Connecticut,
it is inconceivable that Texas and many other states, would
not get any benefit from this new contribution to science.
But let the courts of any [state] devise an improved
"legal antiseptic"-as they wisely have done in certain important mat-
ters-and other states, near by and far away, will go their way for years
in the ancient manner as though an impassible Chinese wall kept them
from all improvements o
84 1& at 600.
35 Another compromising position was recogmzed in Shepherd v. Midland
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949), in which the court
indicated that it would allow opinions of experts on ultimate issues m some
instances, but would not allow those of lay witnesses.
36 1960 U. of Ill. LF 457.
87 Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm n, 19 Ill. 2d 236, 166
N.E.2d 582, 587 (1960).
88 1960 U. Ill. L.F 457.
39 Osborne, The Mind of the Juror 72 (1987).
40 Ibid.
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Many courts continue to adhere to the view which severely restricts
the use of opinion testimony McCormick states that this is the " 'ortho-
dox' view of the many courts who depend only on the encyclopedias
which repeat the formulas of the older cases."' 41 Slowly, however, this
concept is being abandoned in favor of the sounder view that the mere
coincidence with an ultimate issue is no ground for excluding opinion
testimony. This view is being taken by textwriters and statute drafters,
and some jurisdictions have reversed cases with contrary holdings.
Two of the leading textwriters in this field-Wigmore and Mc
Cormick-urge that it should make no difference that an opinion
happens to be on an ultimate issue. Wigmore asserts that there is no
reason for the existence of a rule that precludes this type of opinion
testimony because "no legal power, not even the judge's order, can
compel [the jury] to accept the witness' opinion against their own."
42
McCormick approvingly cites Wignore's view 43 Neither of them
discusses whether the form of the opinion should be considered in
determining its admissibility Since they are so definite about their
positions, it seems that the form would make no difference.
The drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence have included a
provision which allows opinion testimony on ultimate issues. It pro-
vides that "testimony in the form of opinions is not objectionable
because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the
trier of the fact."44 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 do not have
a specific provision for the admissibility of opinion testimony. They do
provide, however, that the judge should consider the rules and statutes
governing federal and state courts, and "in any case, the statute or rule
which favors the reception of the evidence [shall] govern "46 Since
the federal rule, as announced in the cases, is to allow opinion testi-
mony on ultimate issues, 47 this type of evidence is admissible in federal
courts regardless of the position taken by the state courts of the respec
tive jIunsdictions.
48
Several states have adopted the liberal view of admitting opinion
testimony on an ultimate issue. Iowa is an example of a jurisdiction
41 McCormck, p. 28.
427 Wigmore, Evidence 18 (3d ed. 1940).
43 McCormick, p. 26.44 Uniform Rules of Evidence 56(4). The Model Code of Evidence, rule
401 (1942), is in agreement with the Uniform Rules. It provides that "a witness
may state all relevant inferences, whether or not embracig ultimate issues"
unless the judge finds that he is incapable of drawing such inferences or the
witness can communicate what he has perceived with equal accuracy and
adequacy.
4528 U.S.C. Appendix (1958).
46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
47 E.g., Detroit, T.&I. By. v. Banning, 173 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1949).48 Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1951).
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which has reversed itself and accepted this view. As recently as 1930,
the court refused to allow opinion testimony on an ultimate issue by
saying:
[W]hile an expert may be permitted to express his opinion, or even
his belief, he cannot testify to the ultimate fact that must be determined
by the ]ury.49
Later the Iowa court took an entirely opposite stand by stating:
[T]he fact that the matter inquired about is a vital and controlling
fact in a trial, or is even the ultimate fact, which the jury are to pass
upon and determine, is no reason why the opinion should not be
received.50
Many other courts, in varying degrees, have recently discarded the
former view.51
Recommendation
The best approach is to allow a witness to testify on any relevant
point, with testimony couched in any form, irrespective of whether the
testimony is a fact or an opinion. This would allow the witness to
express an opinion on an ultimate issue in the form of a conclusion, if
he is definite about his position. Only in this manner will the jury be
fully informed on all pertinent matters and be prepared to render a sound
verdict. To overcome the objection that this will be a usurpation of
the jury's function, however, the witness should be required to state in
full the data upon which his testimony is founded.52 Then the jury
will be better prepared to gauge the soundness of the testimony and
give it what weight they deem it deserves.53
Frank N. King, Ir
49 State v. Steffon, 210 Iowa 196, 230 N.W 536, 538 (1930).50 Gnrsmore v. Consolidated Prods., Inc., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655
(1942).5 1 S ee, e.g., Woyak v. Komeske, 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W.2d 649 (1952);
Dowling v. L. H. Shattuck, Inc. 91 N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529 (1941); Schweiger v.
Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195 (1951); Hooper v. General Motors Corp.,
123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1958).52 Uniform Rule of Evidence 57 provides that the judge may require this
information. This recommendation changes this from a discretionary procedure
to one that is mandatory.
53 Some writers have contended that it is unnecessary to require divulgence
of this data because it will be elicited on cross-examination in attempting to
debase the witness opinon. There remains the possibility, however, that the
cross-examiner may purposely avoid this line of questioning if he suspects the
op non to be well-founded. In this situation the jury would have heard no more
than a bare opinion and would be unable to knowledgably give it weight. The
mandatory requrement that this data must be given dunng the exammation-m-
chief assures that the jury will not have to rely on the cross-examination to
supply them with this information.
